Ouster clauses, separation of powers and the intention of Parliament : from anisminic to privacy international. by Craig,  Robert
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
24 January 2019
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Craig, Robert (2018) 'Ouster clauses, separation of powers and the intention of Parliament : from anisminic to
privacy international.', Public law., 4 . pp. 570-584.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?productid=7106recordid=469
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Public law following peer
review. The deﬁnitive published version Craig, Robert (2018). Ouster clauses, separation of powers and the intention of
Parliament: From Anisminic to Privacy International. Public Law 4: 570-584 is available online on Westlaw UK or from
Thomson Reuters DocDel service.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
NOT FOR ONWARD CIRCULATION PLEASE 
 
1 
 
Ouster clauses, separation of powers and the intention of parliament: From Anisminic to Privacy 
International1 
 
 
In Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal the courts have been asked to consider again the 
vexed issue of ouster clauses.2 The relevant section of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(‘RIPA’) purports to oust judicial review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (‘IPT’). The key issue in Privacy 
is that the wording of the particular ouster clause is ostensibly stronger than the famous Anisminic clause.3 
After a split decision in the Divisional Court (in effect), the Court of Appeal unanimously held the ouster was 
effective to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court. 
 
This analysis seeks to explore the wider constitutional implications of ouster clauses and, in particular, the 
relevance of the concept of separation of powers which I have elsewhere described as the neglected 
‘Cinderella’ principle of the constitution.4 The central argument is that the court’s treatment of an attempt by 
parliament to oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the high court needs to be more nuanced where the 
apparently immune body is in fact acting in a judicial rather than executive capacity. It is hoped that 
examining the issues in the light of this important distinction will help to clarify how the courts have in fact 
developed different tests when dealing with ouster clauses addressed to judicial rather than executive 
bodies.  
 
This note has three sections. It will first address the Anisminic decision. Secondly, it will deal with how later 
case law applied Anisminic. Thirdly it will address the issues raised by Privacy International itself. It will be 
argued that the Supreme Court should uphold the Court of Appeal decision to give full effect to the ouster 
clause in this case, thus barring judicial review of IPT decisions for error of law. 
 
Introduction 
 
An ouster clause is a provision in an Act of Parliament that purports to prevent a public body from being 
judicially reviewed. The controversy surrounding such clauses stems from the central importance of the right 
of ordinary citizens to ensure the legality of decisions made by public bodies via legal action, a principle said 
to flow from the rule of law. Judicial review is the means by which the legal actions of such bodies are 
policed by the senior courts. To understand how the courts treat ouster clauses that purport to restrict that 
right, it is essential to examine closely how public bodies, the courts and parliament interrelate. Mark Elliott 
has helpfully suggested that  
 
“ouster clauses … supply a theatre of institutional engagement that enables us to view the workings of 
the British constitution up close.”5 
 
This is because the treatment of such clauses is a crucible in which the limits of the relationships between 
the main constitutional actors are tested and determined. Ouster clauses appear to place into tension two 
core constitutional principles which are that the will of parliament must be obeyed and that ordinary citizens 
should be able to challenge public bodies in court in accordance with the rule of law.  
 
Anisminic 
 
Anisminic is now generally seen as the classic example of the treatment of ouster clauses by the courts. The 
case concerned an application for compensation made by Anisminic Ltd to the Foreign Compensation 
Commission (the ‘FCC’). The compensation was claimed following the confiscation of Anisminic’s property 
after an Egyptian Government nationalisation programme. The Egyptian Government consequently paid an 
(insufficient) amount to the UK government to recompense those who had been affected. The FCC was 
                                               
1 The author would like to thank the participants at a Society of Legal Scholars Conference on 18-19 May 2018 for their 
helpful comments on a paper presenting the core ideas, particularly Peter Cane, Maurice Sunkin, Robert Thomas, Alex 
Latham and TT Arvind. The author would also like to thank Sir Stephen Sedley, Carol Harlow, Tom Hickman, Tom Poole, 
Gavin Phillipson, Paul Daly, Paul F. Scott and David Feldman for their helpful (and speedy) comments on a previous 
draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2017] EWCA Civ 1868 – decided on 23 November 2017. 
3 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
4 See Robert Craig: ‘Black Spiders Weaving Webs: The Constitutional Implications of Executive Veto of Tribunal 
Determinations’ [2016] 79(1) Modern Law Review 166-182, particularly pp.171-175, discussing R (Evans) v Att-Gen 
[2015] A.C. 1787. 
5 Mark Elliott, ‘Through the Looking-Glass? Ouster Clauses, Statutory Interpretation and the British Constitution’, in Hunt, 
Neudorf and Rankin, Legislating Statutory Interpretation: Perspectives from the Common Law World (Carswell: 2018), 
p.20. 
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given the task of allocating the money on a complex percentage basis according to how much was found to 
have been lost.6 It rejected Anisminic’s compensation claim, in essence, because it wrongly thought that 
Anisminic’s claim had been assigned to a third party, and that Anisminic had thereby forfeited its right to 
compensation from the FCC.  
 
Section 4 (4) of the Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, provides that  
 
“The determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be 
called in question in any court of law.” 
 
The House of Lords held, famously, that the ouster clause did not bite on the determination of the 
Commission in this case because it had made an error of law, which put the decision it had made outside the 
jurisdiction granted to it by the Act. This rendered the FCC’s apparent determination merely a ‘purported’ 
determination - thus neatly circumventing the application of the ouster clause. The decision in Anisminic was 
eventually considered to have swept away the old distinction between errors inside and outside jurisdiction 
such that when a public body makes a mistake of law, it always acts outside its jurisdiction.7 This novel rule 
was by no means obvious when the case was originally decided - but became clearer in later case law. The 
rationale for eviscerating ouster clauses by treating all errors of law as going to jurisdiction is that parliament 
cannot normally have intended to prevent the courts from patrolling the legal boundaries of administrative 
action. As Lord Diplock pointed out in a later case, the FCC in Anisminic was one of the ‘administrative 
tribunals’ at which the ratio of the case was aimed.8 Crucially, from a separation of powers point of view, the 
FCC was acting in an executive capacity.  
 
Separation of powers 
 
The approach of the courts before Anisminic appears to have been underpinned by a particular, and 
arguably mistaken, view of the separation of powers. The courts were reluctant to intervene when 
considering issues that were not strictly “judicial” in nature. It would be fair to say that the judiciary now 
approach these issues from a rather different angle, increasingly influenced by the view that to permit the 
executive to act without clear legal authority would be contrary to the intention of parliament as expressed in 
statute, whose limits are enforced by the judiciary. All three aspects of the classical separation of powers 
doctrine are thereby raised in this line of case law. 
 
Anisminic can in one sense be understood as part of the deliberate rethinking of what the separation of 
powers really requires in this area. If a distinction is drawn between the executive functions of an 
administrative body and any questions of law that concern it, then it might be thought that separation of 
powers actually requires judicial supervision of administrative bodies who should not be determining the 
answers to questions of law that frame their decision-making process. The executive determining questions 
of law would be a breach of the separation of powers. As Nolan LJ said in M v Home Office 
  
“the courts will respect all acts of the executive within its lawful province, and … the executive will 
respect all decisions of the courts as to what its lawful province is.”9 
 
Furthermore, this conception of what the separation of powers requires is reconcilable with the sovereignty 
of parliament because administrative bodies carrying out executive functions cannot have been intended by 
parliament to be able to act outside the powers it has granted and the courts should be alive to occasions 
where the line is crossed.10 More important for this piece is the conceptually different question of what the 
attitude of the courts is, and should be, to the entirely separate category of cases where there are ouster 
clauses protecting the exercise of judicial functions.  
 
Ouster clauses applied to judicial bodies 
 
In Privacy, the relevant body, the IPT, exercises a judicial function. The appropriate analysis of ouster 
clauses concerning bodies exercising a judicial function is conceptually distinct from the application of such 
clauses to bodies exercising an executive function. At one level, there is something faintly incongruous about 
                                               
6 For a comprehensive discussion, see David Feldman, “Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission: In 
perspective”, in Juss & Sunkin (eds) Landmark Cases in Public Law (Oxford – Portland Oregon: 2017), Chapter 4. 
7 See for example, O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 363 per Lord Diplock. 
8 In Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] A.C. 374, 382. 
9 M v Home Office [1992] QB 270, 314, adopting a formulation put forward by Stephen Sedley QC in his oral 
submissions. 
10 Christopher Forsyth, ‘Of fig leaves and fairy tales: the ultra vires doctrine, the sovereignty of parliament and judicial 
review’, Forsyth ed. Judicial Review and the Constitution (Oxford – Portland Oregon: 2000), pp.29-46. 
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the idea of a judicial review of a judicial decision. Normally, a challenge to a judicial decision would be by 
way of an appeal to a higher judicial authority, not a judicial review. This is not possible in ouster clause 
cases because the ouster clause prevents an appeal.   
 
In a series of cases, the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over judicial bodies has been brought 
close to, but not entirely in line with the post-Anisminic interventionist approach taken by the High Court in 
dealing with administrative bodies. There remains, however, a clear set of circumstances where the writ of 
the High Court does not run. It will be argued that Privacy International falls within those circumstances and 
the ouster clause applicable in this case should therefore be deemed to be effective. The case law on ouster 
clauses of bodies with judicial functions in fact sub-divides into two separate categories and the question is 
the category in which parliament intended to have placed the decision in question. 
 
There can be no doubt that parliament has the power to alter, amend or reallocate the jurisdictional authority 
of the courts. The post-Anisminic story for ouster clauses concerning bodies exercising judicial functions 
begins with the case of Pearlman in which Lord Denning MR considered an ouster clause that appeared to 
govern a decision made by a county court judge in a property dispute. 11 Lord Denning argued that the 
distinction between errors of law that do and do not go to jurisdiction was  
 
“so fine ...that it is rapidly being eroded … in truth the High Court has a choice before it whether to 
interfere with an inferior court on a point of law.”12   
 
He went on to say that he thought that  
 
“this distinction should now be discarded… [because] all courts and tribunals, when faced with the 
same point of law, should decide the same way.” 13 
 
It will be noted that this rationale is wholly different to the separation of powers rationale for maintaining 
supervision of executive bodies. The justification for supervision of the executive focuses on the fact that the 
executive should not be determining the correct interpretation of the law at all and where there is doubt, the 
judicial view must prevail on this issue. Lord Denning’s view of ouster clauses of judicial bodies centres on 
the claim that all judicial bodies should decide the law in “the same way”. These rationales are strikingly 
different: the latter has nothing to do with the separation of powers. 
 
The effect of Lord Denning’s ‘general rule’ would be to replicate the interventionist Anisminic approach in 
relation to ouster clauses protecting the decisions of inferior judicial bodies. This would be controversial 
because it would draw no distinction between the rationales for the treatment of executive and judicial 
bodies.  
 
Insisting on oversight of the executive is based on the unacceptability of executive power without judicial 
supervision. Where there is an ouster clause of a judicial body, the judicial element of the separation of 
powers has not in fact been excluded - by definition. The issue is whether the judicial body should be 
reviewable itself, which is a rather different conceptual question – and arguably a less constitutionally 
problematic one.  
 
It is not even clear that separation of powers is seriously at stake in the context of ouster clauses relating to 
judicial bodies because the question in such situations is whether a judicial body should be reviewable by 
another judicial body. Furthermore, whilst it is unacceptable for the executive to determine questions of law, 
the power of judicial bodies to interpret the meaning of legislation is universally accepted. It is therefore 
doubtful that separation of powers is even relevant to the issues in this area, unlike in Anisminic-type cases. 
 
Lord Denning was in the majority in Pearlman. The dissenting judgment of the future Lord Chief Justice 
Geoffrey Lane held that  
 
“if this judge is acting outside his jurisdiction, so then is every judge who comes to a wrong decision on 
a point of law.”14 
 
Lane LJ’s narrowly dissenting approach was expressly approved by the House of Lords in Racal which is 
considered next. If Lord Denning’s general rule had been accepted, bodies operating in a judicial capacity 
                                               
11 Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1979] QB 56. 
12 Above, 70. 
13 Above, 70. 
14 Above, 76. 
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would always be overruled whenever they made a mistake of law. This would be to institute, controversially, 
a de facto appeal procedure by judicial fiat because any error of law made by an inferior court would be (in 
effect) appealable in judicial review proceedings to the High Court.  
 
The two situations can therefore be contrasted. In the Anisminic line of cases, separation of powers arguably 
justifies a restrictive approach to ouster clauses because otherwise the executive can seemingly operate 
without judicial supervision. By contrast, the existence of judicial supervision of judicial bodies raises no 
separation of powers concerns. The question of whether all tribunals should decide cases in the same way is 
arguably a rule of law issue, not a separation of powers issue, and even then the apparent rule of law aspect 
needs to be weighed carefully against clear parliamentary intention. The rule of law arguments are 
themselves finely balanced in any event. This is discussed further below. It is suggested that these wider 
constitutional factors undermine the claim that Privacy should be considered as just a matter of statutory 
construction simply requiring comparison of the language of the Anisminic ouster clause and the Privacy 
ouster clause. 
 
Racal  
 
In Racal, a High Court judge was asked to exercise a statutory jurisdiction to permit prosecutors to inspect 
the paperwork of a particular company.15 He refused the application on a point of statutory construction. 
Section 441(3) Companies Act 1948 stated that the ‘decision of a judge of the High Court… on an 
application under this section shall not be appealable.’ S 441(3) was thus a clear ouster clause. The Court of 
Appeal disagreed with the judge’s decision and made an order reversing the decision of the High Court.16 
Since the judge’s decision was not appealable, the reversal in the outcome could not have been a 
straightforward appeal and was therefore a de facto certiorari and a fresh decision de novo. This was, in 
effect, an appeal because correcting an error of law in this context is indistinguishable from an appeal. The 
fact that the Court of Appeal decision clearly circumvented the ouster clause meant that the House of Lords 
was confronted, inescapably, with the question whether to extend the Anisminic interventionist approach 
beyond just administrative bodies to include decisions made in inferior courts, including by a High Court 
judge.  
 
Lord Diplock expressly rejected the broadening of the Anisminic doctrine argued for by Lord Denning. He 
pointed out that the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction was limited because it had only an appellate jurisdiction 
rather than any original jurisdiction.17 A de facto consideration of an application to quash the judge’s decision 
amounted to the Court of Appeal hearing a novel judicial review claim which was outside its jurisdiction as 
well as, incidentally, outside the House of Lords jurisdiction. This was because neither court had original 
jurisdiction. 
 
Lord Diplock went on to consider whether judicial review could lie against a court decision in general. He 
expressly distinguished Anisminic on the basis that it was dealing with bodies acting in an administrative 
capacity rather than judicial capacity and claimed that the case created a “presumption” with administrative 
decisions that where there is any doubt about the question to be answered, the courts must “resolve” it “as 
interpreters of the written law”.18 Distinguishing the Anisminic line of case law in this way must be correct, not 
least on the separation of powers grounds already argued. 
 
Lord Diplock went on to hold that “there is no such presumption where a decision-making power is conferred 
by statute upon a court of law”.19 Each case “depends on the construction of the statute” but a  
 
“superior court conducting the review should not be astute to hold that Parliament did not intend the 
inferior court to have jurisdiction to decide for itself.”20 
 
The double negative is confusing but in essence, Lord Diplock held that where parliament intended to oust 
the jurisdiction of the High Court over inferior courts, such clauses should be more generously construed 
than clauses concerning executive bodies.  The reason for the different treatment could simply be the lack of 
separation of powers implications when considering judicial supervision of courts. In those constitutional 
                                               
15 In re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374, 384. 
16 In re Racal Communications Ltd [1980] Ch. 138. 
17 Above, n 15, 392. 
18 Above, 382-3. 
19 Above, 383. 
20 Above. 
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circumstances, parliament’s linguistic clarity burden may be considerably diminished. Lord Hoffmann’s 
principle of legality may be more easily satisfied.21 
 
A potential bright line distinction  
 
The implications of Lord Diplock’s important judgment could have been profound. If a genuine and bright line 
distinction had been drawn between ouster clauses protecting administrative decisions and those protecting 
judicial decisions, then a clear and logical approach could have been easily discerned and defended. It 
would make complete sense to insist on the clearest possible language before administrative bodies could 
determine questions of law themselves, precisely because it is the constitutional function of the courts to 
interpret the written law as set down by parliament. Judicial decisions would be a different matter because 
the issue in such cases is whether parliament intends there to be deviations from the general law. 
 
This distinction drawn between review of administrative and judicial bodies has some support in recent case 
law. A v B concerned a judicial review brought by a former Security Service agent against the decision to 
refuse him permission to publish a book.22 The issue was whether the claim had to be heard in the IPT. 
Although the issue of the effectiveness of the ouster clause was obiter, Lord Brown said that Parliament had 
“not ousted judicial scrutiny of the acts of the intelligence services; it [had] simply allocated that scrutiny... to 
the IPT”.23 Lord Brown’s heavyweight endorsement of the view that the ouster clause in RIPA was an 
effective one was described by Sales LJ as “powerful persuasive authority” and “a considered view 
expressed as part of a very careful analysis of the IPT regime established by RIPA”.24 Most importantly, 
perhaps, it is consistent with the claim that RIPA reallocates rather than ousts judicial supervisory authority. 
 
Unfortunately, the bright line distinction drawn by Lord Diplock, and arguably supported by Lord Brown, has 
not persisted and the courts have moved much closer to Denning’s general rule in Pearlman for reasons that 
are somewhat difficult to discern. In O’Reilly v Mackman, Lord Diplock himself appeared to have changed his 
mind on the applicability of the distinction he himself had drawn in Racal.25 As Wade points out, “according to 
[Lord Diplock’s] gospel... all error of law by an inferior tribunal or court amounts to excess of jurisdiction”.26 
Wade goes on to say that the Page case (to which we must now turn) “decided unanimously that Lord 
Diplock’s gospel is canonical”.27  
 
Page  
 
The next stage in the story is the House of Lords decision in Page.28 It diverges considerably from the bright 
line distinction seemingly drawn between judicial and administrative decisions in Racal. Interestingly, the 
case concerned judicial review of a judicial body without any statutory involvement. It therefore does not 
raise any issues relating to the doctrine of separation of powers, by contrast with examples in the Anisminic 
line of case law. As argued earlier, this could justify a more nuanced and differentiated approach in this self-
contained area of the common law because the constitutional issues at stake are strikingly different. 
 
The case concerned a claim by a university lecturer whose employment had been terminated for 
redundancy. The applicant sought a declaration that the dismissal was unlawful from the ‘University Visitor’ 
who had an exclusive jurisdiction to consider such claims in a university context and was at all times acting in 
a judicial capacity. The declaration sought was refused, which prompted the applicant to seek judicial review 
of the refusal against the Lord President of the Privy Council acting on behalf of the Visitor. The House of 
Lords held, (by 3-2) that the long history of exclusive jurisdiction of University Visitors meant that the High 
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.  
 
The crucial development in the approach of the courts was set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson. His judgment 
makes clear that the Anisminic interventionist approach now applies not just to administrative bodies but also 
to inferior bodies acting in a judicial capacity. The judge said  
 
“in general any error of law made by an administrative tribunal or inferior court in reaching its decision 
can be quashed for error of law.”29 
                                               
21 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. 
22 A v B [2010] 2 AC, 32, para [23]. 
23 Above, para [23]. 
24 Above n 2, para [48]. 
25 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 279.  
26 Wade “Visitors and error of law”, (1993) LQR 155, 157 (emphasis added). 
27 Above. 
28 R v Lord President of the Privy Council, Ex parte Page [1993] A.C. 682. 
29 Above, 702. 
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Given the broad nature of this ruling, it might be wondered why in the particular case of Page, the visitor was 
not subjected to judicial review jurisdiction. Lord Browne-Wilkinson says that for the visitors, it was as if there 
was a ‘final and conclusive’ clause covering the visitors’ jurisdiction.30 There was therefore no jurisdiction for 
the High Court to review. 
 
The last point may appear somewhat confusing. Given Page confirmed that ouster clauses are generally 
ineffective, the reference to an ouster clause as being operative in this case might seem somewhat odd 
given Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that ‘in general’ ouster clauses are not effective. (This is without even 
addressing the fact that in Page there was in fact no “final and conclusive” clause because there was no 
statute). The resolution of this wrinkle is that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment reveals a sub-category of 
judicial bodies that are exempt from the general rule that bodies (whether executive or judicial) that make an 
error of law are judicially reviewable.  
 
The relevant test is whether the jurisdiction of the judicial body is meant to comply with the “general law of 
the land”.31 This is arguably rooted in Lord Denning’s claim that tribunals should generally decide the law “in 
the same way”.32 It is also conceptually and analytically distinct from the justificatory underpinnings for 
judicial supervision of executive decisions.  
 
It might be thought that it is axiomatic that all areas of law should be compliant with the “general law”. This is 
clearly disproved by Page. The court held that the University Visitor  
 
“is applying not the general law of the land but a peculiar, domestic law of which he is the sole arbiter 
and of which the courts have no cognisance.”33  
 
To be clear, this test in effect revived, for a small sub-category of cases, the old test of errors of law inside 
and outside jurisdiction. The University Visitor had the power to make decisions within his jurisdiction that the 
senior courts could not inquire into. This confirms the possibility of ‘islands’ of local law if the particular case 
falls within the sub-category set out above. Courts with differing jurisdictions have a long history in the 
common law. It is not obvious what principled basis prevents parliament reinstituting differential jurisdictions 
if it so desires. The rule of law does not require one universal law. At most it requires access to independent 
judicial adjudication which is not the same thing at all. 
 
For the majority of situations, it must be remembered, the rule is that inferior courts must comply with the 
general law of the land and ouster clauses in such situations will be ineffective without crystal clear words. 
The courts work on the assumption that parliament intends the general law to be consistent unless it makes 
a contrary intention absolutely clear in accordance with the principle of legality.  
 
There are a number of useful examples that illustrate the new, settled, rule that in general, ouster clauses 
concerning judicial bodies should be narrowly construed. In Woolas, an Election Court constituted under s 
123 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 was judicially reviewed for an error of law and the High 
Court determined that it had jurisdiction to quash the decision of the Election Court in judicial review 
proceedings even though there was a clear ouster clause in s 144(1) of the 1983 Act.34  
 
The reason Woolas was decided this way was because it was unsustainable to claim that the Election Court 
had the power to make errors of law. There was no realistic basis for claiming parliament had genuinely 
intended to create an island of local law under the relevant Act. This case therefore illustrates the application 
of the general rule, following Page, to an inferior court. A good second example is the decision in U v SIAC 
where Laws LJ made a similar point about the tribunal which operated in a judicial capacity.35   
 
There are thus two categories concerning judicial review of judicial bodies. The general rule is that judicial 
bodies must comply with the “general law of the land”. Page shows that there may, however, be legacy 
examples of judicial bodies with jurisdictional autonomy. In addition, and exceptionally, parliament may make 
clear that it intends that deviation from the general law can occur. When this happens, parliament creates an 
island of local law that is immune from judicial review. The next case is arguably a good example of such an 
intention, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts on this point. 
                                               
30 Above, 703. 
31 Above, 702. 
32 Above, n 13. 
33 Above, 702. 
34 R (Woolas) v Parliamentary Election Court [2012] QB 1. 
35 [2011] Q.B. 120. 
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Application to Cart36 
 
The Cart decision can only be addressed briefly here. Crucially, it also concerns judicial review of judicial 
decisions. Cart concerned whether the Upper Tribunal, as a “superior court of record”, could be subject to 
judicial review.37 The Upper Tribunal was set up to be the apex of the tribunal system under the Tribunals 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Laws LJ in the Divisional Court was persuaded that parliament had 
conferred on the Upper Tribunal the power to determine the law within its jurisdiction without the possibility of 
review for error of law. This was a particularly notable finding given that Laws LJ is a leading proponent of 
the alleged general, unlimited common law jurisdiction of the High Court.38 
 
Sedley LJ for a unanimous Court of Appeal took a not dissimilar approach on the core issue.39 Crucially, he 
drew the precise distinction set out in Page earlier. He specifically claimed that a “mere error of law made in 
the course of an adjudication” was insufficient for the court to have judicial review jurisdiction.40 He based 
this on the fact that “the model of judicial review… which seems to us to implement Parliament's intent … is 
one which secures the boundaries of the system but does not invade it”.41 This in effect applied the Page test 
and specifically recognised that the Upper Tribunal had a mandate from parliament to determine the relevant 
applicable law such that the senior courts could not inquire whether there has been an error of law by the 
Upper Tribunal when exercising its judicial functions. The new structure of the Tribunal system and the 
evident desire of parliament to make it, basically, autonomous makes Sedley LJ’s reasoning compelling. 
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court blurred the clear “boundaries” mapped out by Sedley LJ. It held that the 
criteria for permitting judicial review of a decision of the Upper Tribunal should be the ‘second appeal’ 
criteria; namely that appeal is allowed if an important point of principle or practice is raised or there is some 
other “compelling reason”. In such circumstances judicial review of an Upper Tribunal decision would lie. 
This was said to be a pragmatic compromise between the two extremes of full judicial review and the narrow 
pre-Anisminic jurisdictional test set out in Page and effectively applied by Sedley LJ in the court below. 
Unfortunately, as with many compromises that fudge hard choices, the decision simply falls between two 
stools, capturing the worst of both worlds.  
 
On the one hand, it accepts that in many (perhaps even most) cases, the UT will be permitted to make errors 
of law within jurisdiction without review. This nicely coincides with the recognition in the Divisional Court and 
Court of Appeal that parliament clearly intended to create a separate and self-contained jurisdiction, 
supervised by the Upper Tribunal acting as a court and that, most of the time, matters of law will not be 
reviewed if determined within jurisdiction. This acceptance is fatal for the contrary claim that all errors of law 
are necessarily outside of jurisdiction absent the clearest possible language. That bright line rule underpins 
Anisminic but only applies to administrative bodies, not judicial bodies because, as we have seen, the courts 
have applied a different, more nuanced, test to bodies exercising a judicial function. Furthermore, the 
constitutional rationales are completely different. 
 
At the same time, and somewhat inconsistently, Cart is also now authority for the proposition that if it is 
claimed that the Upper Tribunal has made an important error of law, judicial review will lie (not an appeal). 
This undermines the claim that parliament intended to confer a separate jurisdiction for the Upper Tribunal. If 
parliament in fact did not intend to grant such a jurisdiction to make errors of law, judicial review should 
arguably lie in all cases. This is because if parliament did not intend for it to be able to err in law, the Upper 
Tribunal should comply with the general law as Page laid down. The binary question of whether the tribunal 
system was intended to comply with the general law is a question of parliamentary intention, not judicial 
discretion. 
 
This case therefore must raise concerns about the extent to which parliament is being restricted, by the 
courts, in its ability to alter, amend or reallocate the statutory jurisdiction of the courts and other bodies 
exercising judicial functions. It is problematic, conceptually and constitutionally, for the courts to create - out 
of thin air - a highly specialised appeal process that is normally used in specific and narrow circumstances 
laid down by parliament and label it ‘judicial review’. This is particularly the case for a body exercising a 
judicial function that the courts have simultaneously accepted has had conferred on it, by parliament, the 
authority and jurisdiction to determine the law within its jurisdiction without review by the senior courts. The 
                                               
36 R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 A.C. 663. 
37 S 3(5) Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
38 Laws “Illegality: The problem of jurisdiction” in Supperstone & Goudie (eds) Judicial Review (Butterworths: 1992), p.51. 
39 R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal (Court of Appeal) [2011] QB 120. 
40 Above, para [36]. 
41 Above, para [42]. 
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imposition of a second appeal test on the Upper tribunal in Cart is arguably an example of unwarranted 
judicial legislation. The sovereignty of parliament, in the Diceyan sense, was thereby compromised.42 It is 
important to recognise that judicial legislation like this is also a breach of the separation of powers, but in a 
completely different way from the earlier discussion. 
 
Privacy International 
 
Privacy International concerned whether the intelligence services could justify the use of a general warrant to 
engage in ‘computer hacking’ ostensibly under s 5 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Judicial review was 
sought against a decision made by the IPT. The IPT was set up by statute to permit the legality of actions 
taken by the security services to be tested independently by a body exercising a judicial function. The IPT 
exercises a judicial function because it deals only with questions of law not the merits of substantive 
decisions by the security services.  
 
Furthermore, the IPT is the only available forum for actions against the intelligence services under s 7 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (actions under s 7 must be considered by a judicial body).43 The IPT may be 
labelled a “tribunal” but it acts as a court. What matters is that the function of the relevant body in the 
particular case is carefully assessed and classified. This should happen in every case where ouster clauses 
are considered in order to maintain a clear distinction between ouster clauses attached to bodies exercising 
administrative functions and those exercising judicial functions. It is the function exercised that matters, not 
the label appended.44  
 
Section 67(8) of RIPA states: 
 
“Determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to 
whether they have jurisdiction) shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in 
any court.”  
 
This clause can be contrasted with the ouster clause in Anisminic which stated that: 
 
“The determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not 
be called in question in any court of law.” 
 
Comparing just the language of the two ouster clauses (notwithstanding earlier discussion) demonstrates 
that the Privacy clause is clearly more robust than the original Anisminic clause. In particular, the words in 
brackets repay careful consideration. At first sight, they appear to grant to the IPT the power to determine its 
own jurisdiction qua court in a way that makes it challenging to see how the High Court could justifiably 
exercise any supervisory jurisdiction over determinations of law by the IPT.  
 
The linguistic differences between the two clauses were not sufficient to persuade Leggatt J (as he then 
was) sitting in the Divisional Court with Lord Justice Leveson PQBD.45 Leggatt’s view was that the treatment 
of the wording in Anisminic was not materially different to the treatment that would be required to impose a 
similar supervisory jurisdiction by the High Court in the case of the IPT. Leggatt adopted what might be 
called the Denning-style broad approach in his decision and rested his judgment on his view of the 
necessary requirements of the rule of law. His primary focus was attacking the possibility of there being any 
‘legal island[s]’ that are outside the jurisdiction of the senior courts.46 He said: 
 
“The reason why the High Court exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over all lower courts and 
statutory tribunals is to maintain the rule of law.”47  
 
Leggatt insisted that judicial review of judicial bodies that are undertaking judicial review proceedings should 
be possible. It is suggested that Leggatt’s fairly narrow conception of the rule of law is open to challenge. 
The rule of law does not require hegemony. The IPT is an independent judicial body with prospective, clear, 
                                               
42 See also Boughey and Burton Crawford, ‘Reconsidering R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal and the rationale for jurisdictional 
error’, [2012] Public Law 592. 
43 See s 65(2) and s 65(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
44 The author has argued elsewhere for greater definitional clarity in classifying whether bodies are exercising executive 
or judicial functions. See n 4, above, discussing Evans v Attorney-General [2015] A.C. 1787. 
45 Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2017] EWHC 114 (Admin), 2nd February 2017 
46 Above, para [49]. 
47 Above. per Leggatt J, para [48]. See also Paul F. Scott, “Ouster clauses and national security: judicial review of the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal”, [2017] Public Law 355-362. 
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open, stable and general rules that have been set out in advance with hearings that are subject to the rules 
of natural justice.48 This tends to undermine any claims that the absence of an appeal procedure from the 
IPT necessarily breaches basic rule of law principles. Much more in-depth analytical justification would be 
required to make that claim good. No one is denied access to a court by s 67(8) RIPA.  
 
It is difficult to see how the absence of the right to an appeal undermines the right to independent judicial 
adjudication to the extent that a fundamental breach of the rule of law has occurred that could in turn justify 
the highly strained reading of the clear words of the statute suggested by Leggatt J. In the sense of ensuring 
there is access to a court, this case is far removed from Anisminic. To the extent the application to the 
Supreme Court relies on a generic appeal to the rule of law as its core thesis, the argument is weak. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to consider the damage to the clarity and certainty the rule of law is meant to 
promote if the courts were to disregard the wording of s 67(8) RIPA and the clear intention of parliament. 
Demanding crystal clear words where otherwise the executive could operate outside the law is one thing. 
Insisting that parliament cannot prevent the senior courts imposing their interpretation of RIPA on the IPT in 
the teeth of parliamentary intention to the contrary is quite another. The words in brackets are particularly 
clear about parliament’s intention as to who has final say on the jurisdiction of the IPT. Imposing a higher 
burden of linguistic clarity on parliament requires substantially greater justification than vague and semi-
articulated appeals to the “rule of law”. 
 
Leveson PQBD in the Divisional Court, and Sales LJ for a unanimous Court of Appeal, took a radically 
different view to Leggatt J.49 Their approach is consistent with the test in Page and the views of Sedley LJ in 
Cart. Crucially, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 amended RIPA to introduce ‘second tier’ appeal 
requirements on the IPT but the later Act was not passed until a date after the hearing in this matter. The 
main implication of this is that it would arguably be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to impose the same 
test in Privacy as was applied by the Supreme Court in Cart. This is because if parliament had intended 
there to be a second-tier appeal mechanism that was in fact introduced at a later stage then it would have 
done so from the beginning when the legislation was originally passed. Reading such a mechanism into the 
statute would be further judicial legislation usurping the role and function of parliament. It is difficult to see 
how the Cartian dilemma can be avoided this time. 
 
It is suggested that the intention of parliament when it created a judicial framework to consider the legality of 
activities of the security services was to create a regime that was distinct from the general law. Parliament 
intended that the IPT could make uncorrected errors of law precisely because it was additionally granted the 
power to address questions about its own jurisdiction, as Sales LJ efficiently argued in the Court of Appeal.50 
Sales bolstered his argument by considering the detailed rules about what information could be adduced in 
evidence and the confidentiality with which such information was treated by the IPT.51  
 
The determinative factor, of course, must be the meaning and effect of the ouster clause itself in all the 
circumstances. It appears to confer on the IPT the right to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction. Taking 
a step back for a moment, it must be repeated that the constitutional context is crucial. Where parliament is 
simply reallocating judicial supervision, Lord Diplock’s exhortation to the courts that they “should not be 
astute hold that Parliament did not intend the inferior court to have jurisdiction” is particularly pertinent.52 This 
approach must be even more relevant when the ouster clause itself appears to make clear that questions of 
jurisdiction are also a matter for the IPT.53 The IPT is a judicial body that, it is suggested, parliament intended 
                                               
48 Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 214-219.  
49 Above and n 2, above. 
50 Privacy, n 2, above. 
51 Sales LJ’s ancillary argument must lose much of its force in the light of the recent decision in the Supreme Court to 
hold that “judicial review can and must accommodate a closed material procedure, where that is the procedure which 
Parliament has authorised in the lower court or tribunal whose decision is under review”. R (Haralambous) v Crown Court 
at St Albans [2018] UKSC 1, para [59]. 
52 Above, n 20. 
53 This takes nothing away from the power of the courts to intervene in the unlikely scenario where the IPT acts 
genuinely outside its jurisdiction in the historic pre-Anisminic sense. It is important to emphasise that making an error of 
law within the jurisdiction conferred by parliament must be clearly conceptually distinguished from genuinely doing 
something parliament did not intend the IPT to be able to do at all. To take an absurd example, if the IPT started deciding 
social security claims, that would be ultra vires in the narrow pre-Anisminic sense. This crucial distinction was recognised 
explicitly by, for example, Sedley LJ in Cart at n 39. Parliament gave no indication that, say, a decision tinged by a “real 
possibility of bias” should be protected. As Pinochet ([2000] 1 A.C. 119) showed, even the apex court can be judicially 
reviewed on such a basis. As always, the key is discerning parliament’s actual intention. This note suggests parliament 
intended the IPT to be able to make errors of law within its jurisdiction. There is no evidence whatsoever that parliament 
intended the IPT to be able to make decisions on social security disputes or be able to make decisions tainted by a real 
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to be able to determine the law within its jurisdiction without review. It has its own jurisdiction. The IPT ouster 
clause should be effective. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This note has attempted to clarify the courts’ approach to attempts to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. 
As virtually every judge says when determining the effect of ouster clauses, parliament has the power to oust 
judicial review if it says so clearly enough – the crucial question is always what parliament intended. It has 
been suggested that when considering how separation of powers affects the analysis, a distinction should be 
drawn between ouster clauses addressed to administrative and judicial bodies.  
 
The case law is clear that ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court to supervise administrative bodies would 
require exceptionally clear words in all cases. Separately, the courts have interpreted ouster clauses for 
judicial bodies in two distinct ways, creating two categories in the case law. The main category applies a 
general rule where parliament has not demonstrated the intention of conferring the power to make errors of 
law on a particular judicial body with sufficiently clear words; such ouster clauses will be narrowly construed. 
 
By contrast, where parliament has indicated sufficiently clearly that it intends the senior courts not to be able 
to review a body exercising a judicial function, that falls into a separate sub-category. Such judicial bodies 
have their own jurisdiction. It is rare for parliament to indicate that this is its intention. Arguably, Cart was one 
such example and Sedley LJ’s judgment is to be preferred to the Supreme Court because it recognises that 
parliament did in that case intend that the tribunal system would be, basically, autonomous. Privacy provides 
us with another example. The recognition of these exceptions by the courts has not been a bold step into 
unknown territory. Islands of local law have long been recognised by the courts, as Page proves. 
 
In Privacy, and arguably Cart, parliament intended to reallocate judicial supervision usually undertaken by 
the High Court to a new statutory body operating in a judicial capacity that cannot itself be judicially reviewed 
by the High Court for error of law. This clear parliamentary intention should be respected. Following Page, 
the possibility of effective ouster clauses covering some specific judicial bodies should be recognised by the 
courts where the intention of parliament is clear, bearing in mind that the courts have historically applied a 
different approach to bodies exercising judicial functions as opposed to bodies exercising executive 
functions. Finally, it is generally suggested that a core constitutional principle, the separation of powers, 
should be given more prominent consideration in determining the issues in areas such as this. 
                                                                                                                                                            
possibility of bias. Making errors of law within jurisdiction and genuinely acting outside jurisdiction in a pre-Anisminic 
sense should be sharply distinguished.  
